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Ian McKay and Jamie Swift. The Vimy Trap: Or, How We Learned
to Stop Worrying and Love the Great War. Toronto: Between the
Lines, 2016. Pp. 372.
This is intended to be a provocative scholarly work, but the clever
title, the combative tone, the dearth of original primary research—all
suggest that this is a polemic. Polemics can raise useful arguments,
and there are some here. But scholarly work engages the existing
scholarship, it does not dismiss it, or worse, misread it. To overstate
the myth of “Vimyism” with its sinister overtones is the work of
polemicists, not serious scholars.
The work’s tone is apparent throughout the book. Its authors seek
to dismantle the “Vimy trap,” the narrative that somehow Canada
became a nation on the battlefield of Vimy Ridge. But “Vimyism”
is even more insidious. We learn that it is an orthodoxy driven by
conservative politicians, soldiers, aging hockey coaches, and historians.
We learn that Vimyism is dangerous for how “it wants us to return to
a day of glorious battle” (p. 11). It is everywhere, from the hats sold
by the Royal Canadian Legion to the attempts by “imperialist” city
councillors to create a “Valour District” in Kingston, Ontario (p. 13).
Vimyism even lurks within the writings of such prominent historians
as Jonathan Vance and Tim Cook. If only Canadians understood the
“childish irrationalism” of Vimyism (p. 263).
Such highly charged views of the present inform a selective study
of the past. A rich historiography on the war’s origins and conduct
is reduced to the simple premise that this was the first modern war.
Present-day Canadians, McKay and Swift argue, forget that the war
was not simply about Canada, and that the 60,000 Canadian dead
were just a small fraction of the millions who died. In this they have
a point. They then maintain that Canadians now ignore the war’s
“moral complexity.” But there is nothing complex about McKay and
Swift’s view of the war. The soldiers of a century ago, we are told,
were largely “pacificists,” a modern label that describes those who
condone war as “a last resort—and then only if undertaken under the
auspices of legitimate international institutions (such as the United
Nations)” (p. 116). It is unclear just how this label can be applied
historically in any meaningful way.
Only through a very selective use of evidence do the authors
trace the long road leading to Vimyism. They claim that the often
gruesome and remorseful letters and memoirs that First World
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War soldiers penned represented the true feelings of Canadians.
That is impossible to know. The authors maintain that a rich peace
movement swept across Canada through the 1930s (p. 129). That is
true, but is it also true that, by the end of the 1930s, “Canadians
had largely reached a consensus—even if expressed in a myriad of
different ways—that the Great War had been an abomination that
should never be repeated”? (p. 108) Did such a consensus linger after
March 1939 after the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia?
Too often the search for Vimyism after 1945 reveals a dismissive
view of warfare that leaves little room for nuance. We learn that the
Korean War was “essentially a u. s . war” that did little but profit
General Electric (p. 168). Aging war correspondents and school text
authors also had little good to say about war in general, or Vimy
Ridge in particular. Neither did filmmakers like Donald Brittain or
Don Shebib, or the veterans they interviewed in the 1960s. Whether
Canadians knew who Brittain or Shebib were is a question the
authors do not ask. Even in 1967, the fiftieth anniversary of the
great battle, the links between Vimy Ridge and nationhood were
not yet tightly forged.
Certainly Pierre Berton helped pave the road to Vimyism in his
1986 book, but even he concluded that Vimy was not worth the cost.1
The authors admit that Berton’s lofty nationalist narrative has had
its critics. Indeed, the authors refer obliquely to a book I co-edited
a decade ago that challenged many of Berton’s more extravagant
claims. Despite what the authors may believe, there has never been
any academic orthodoxy about what Vimy Ridge represented.2
Still, two of our profession’s leading practitioners are targeted
for contributing to a martial nationalism. The criticism is unfair and
ill-conceived, for both Jonathan Vance and Tim Cook are accused of
drawing the wrong conclusions from their own work. Vance makes it
clear from the outset of Death So Noble (1997) that he is not writing
about the war, but rather about the mythology that helped transform
the commemorative landscape in Canada after 1918. Still, Swift and
McKay condemn Vance for his “muted” criticism of the war (p. 217).
They also dismiss Vance’s nuanced study of war memorials, arguing
simply that “to go from funerary moments to a bold generalization
Pierre Berton, Vimy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986).
Geoffrey Hayes, Michael Bechthold, and Andrew Iarocci, eds.. Vimy Ridge: A
Canadian Reassessment (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007).
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about one overwhelmingly dominant ‘memory’ seems hazardous” (p.
218). At a stroke, the thousands of memorials Canadians built after
the First World War are dismissed, as is the rich literature on war
and memory that explores their meanings.
The authors’ attack on Cook’s work is even more curious. Despite
the rich and often graphic detail in his two-volume history of the
war, the authors maintain that Cook fails to acknowledge how truly
unheroic and divisive the war actually was for Canada. In their view,
Cook should have written another book that stressed modernism
rather than nationalism.
Occasionally McKay and Swift hit a mark. They are right that
we need to understand the role of Canadians in the First World War
within a wider framework. However, there is nothing very original
here. Mark Humphries made that case in the Canadian Historical
Review in 2014.3
Indeed, there are few original ideas in this book and too many
sweeping generalisations and lingering prejudices. It may be fine
for two scholars to attack “Vimyism” in a polemic but they cannot
dismiss a rich, nuanced literature on the causes, experiences, impact
and memory of the First World War and have their work considered
serious scholarship.
geoffrey hayes, university of waterloo

3  
Mark Osborne Humphries, “Between Commemoration and History: The
Historiography of the Canadian Corps and Military Overseas,” Canadian Historical
Review 95, no. 3 (September 2014): 384–97.
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